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Abstract 
[Excerpt] The United States and the other 153 members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) have been 
conducting a set or “round” of negotiations called the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) since the end of 
2001. The DDA’s main objective is to refine and expand the rules by which WTO members conduct foreign 
trade with one another. A critical element of the DDA round is the negotiations pertaining to foreign trade 
in services. Trade in services has been covered under multilateral rules only since 1995 with the entry into 
force of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and of the Uruguay Round Agreements 
creating the WTO. 
The negotiations on services in the DDA round have two fundamental objectives. One objective is to 
reform the current GATS rules and principles. The second objective is for each member country to open 
more of its service sectors to foreign competition. The WTO services negotiations have been going on for 
more than 10 years. However, as with the negotiations in agriculture and non-agriculture market access, 
the services negotiations have proceeded slowly with missed deadlines and few results. 
The prospects for the negotiations are difficult to evaluate at this point. It is not unusual for negotiations 
to lag as participants wait to place their best negotiating positions on the table until just before crucial 
deadlines are reached. In July 2006, WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy suspended the DDA negotiations, 
including the services negotiations, because major WTO members could not agree on the terms or 
modalities for negotiations in agriculture and nonagriculture market access. He resumed the negotiations 
in 2007. In 2009, negotiators from major groups of developed and developing countries have worked to 
nail down the basic elements of a draft text; however, they failed so far to reach a consensus on the basic 
negotiating modalities. 2010 also produced little progress as the services negotiations continued to be 
hostage to the negotiations on agricultural and non-agricultural market access (NAMA) negotiations, 
which also showed little progress. In general participants have been reluctant to liberalize services trade 
much beyond their commitments already established in the GATS. 
Several factors will determine if and when the services negotiations will be completed. One factor is the 
political will the WTO members can muster to overcome the obstacles that hamper the negotiations. 
Another factor is to what degree the various participants are willing to compromise on goals in order to 
reach agreements. And a third factor is how quickly the issues in agriculture and non-agriculture market 
access are resolved; the sooner they are resolved the sooner negotiators can devote their attention to the 
services negotiations. This report will be updated as events warrant. Many Members of Congress 
consider the services negotiations to be a critical part, if not the most critical part, of the DDA round. 
These Members require strong commitments from U.S. trading partners to remove barriers in trade in 
services as part of an overall trade agreement they could support.. The DDA negotiations, including the 
negotiations on services, could be the subject of oversight during the 112th Congress. 
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Summary 
The United States and the other 153 members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) have been 
conducting a set or “round” of negotiations called the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) since 
the end of 2001. The DDA’s main objective is to refine and expand the rules by which WTO 
members conduct foreign trade with one another. A critical element of the DDA round is the 
negotiations pertaining to foreign trade in services. Trade in services has been covered under 
multilateral rules only since 1995 with the entry into force of the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS) and of the Uruguay Round Agreements creating the WTO.  
The negotiations on services in the DDA round have two fundamental objectives. One objective 
is to reform the current GATS rules and principles. The second objective is for each member 
country to open more of its service sectors to foreign competition. The WTO services 
negotiations have been going on for more than 10 years. However, as with the negotiations in 
agriculture and non-agriculture market access, the services negotiations have proceeded slowly 
with missed deadlines and few results. 
The prospects for the negotiations are difficult to evaluate at this point. It is not unusual for 
negotiations to lag as participants wait to place their best negotiating positions on the table until 
just before crucial deadlines are reached. In July 2006, WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy 
suspended the DDA negotiations, including the services negotiations, because major WTO 
members could not agree on the terms or modalities for negotiations in agriculture and non-
agriculture market access. He resumed the negotiations in 2007. In 2009, negotiators from major 
groups of developed and developing countries have worked to nail down the basic elements of a 
draft text; however, they failed so far to reach a consensus on the basic negotiating modalities. 
2010 also produced little progress as the services negotiations continued to be hostage to the 
negotiations on agricultural and non-agricultural market access (NAMA) negotiations, which also 
showed little progress. In general participants have been reluctant to liberalize services trade 
much beyond their commitments already established in the GATS.  
Several factors will determine if and when the services negotiations will be completed. One factor 
is the political will the WTO members can muster to overcome the obstacles that hamper the 
negotiations. Another factor is to what degree the various participants are willing to compromise 
on goals in order to reach agreements. And a third factor is how quickly the issues in agriculture 
and non-agriculture market access are resolved; the sooner they are resolved the sooner 
negotiators can devote their attention to the services negotiations. This report will be updated as 
events warrant. Many Members of Congress consider the services negotiations to be a critical 
part, if not the most critical part, of the DDA round. These Members require strong commitments 
from U.S. trading partners to remove barriers in trade in services as part of an overall trade 
agreement they could support.. The DDA negotiations, including the negotiations on services, 
could be the subject of oversight during the 112th Congress. 
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he United States and the other 153 members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) have 
been engaged in a set or “round” of negotiations called the Doha Development Agenda 
(DDA) since December 2001. The DDA’s main objective is to refine and expand the rules 
by which WTO members conduct foreign trade with one another. A critical element of the DDA 
round is the negotiations pertaining to foreign trade in services. Trade in services has been 
covered under multilateral rules only since 1995 with the entry into force of the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the Uruguay Round Agreements creating the WTO. 
The U.S. services sector is among the world’s most advanced, efficient and open, especially in 
such areas as financial services and telecommunication services. Services are a significant part of 
the U.S. economy and the source of most U.S. employment. Such is the case also with many other 
economically advanced countries. For many years, many in Congress and successive 
administrations have been pressing to make trade liberalization in services a priority in 
multilateral trade negotiations and a priority in the current round. In so doing, the United States 
has sought trade opportunities especially in developing countries for a competitive sector of the 
U.S. economy. 
The U.S. business community considers the DDA negotiations in services critical to providing 
predictability in global markets for services.1 Furthermore, the outcome of the services 
negotiations likely will have a significant impact on the credibility of the GATS, which remains a 
fledgling system of rules. If the negotiations fail, it would be considered by many observers a 
setback for U.S. trade policy. 
Congress would have to pass implementing legislation in order for any agreement on services (or 
for any agreement reached during the DDA) to become part of U.S. obligations under the WTO. 
However, before the agreement stage, Congress plays a consultative role during the negotiations 
as required by the legislation granting the President the fast track trade negotiating authority.2 
Under this authority, the President can negotiate trade agreements that would be handled under 
expedited congressional procedures (limited debate and no amendments). Through consultation, 
Members can try to ensure that the Administration fulfills negotiating objectives as set out in 
trade law and is otherwise protecting U.S. economic interests as the Congress perceives them. 
The current trade promotion expired on July 1, 2007, and will have to be renewed before any 
DDA agreement would receive expedited congressional consideration. 
Many Members of Congress consider the services negotiations to be a critical part, if not the most 
critical part of the DDA round. These Members require strong commitments from U.S. trading 
partners to remove barriers in trade in services as part of an overall trade agreement they could 
support. This report is designed to assist the 112th Congress to understand and monitor progress of 
the negotiations and the major issues that the negotiators are addressing. The report provides a 
brief background section on the significance of services to the U.S. economy. It then explains 
briefly the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the structure and agenda of the 
services negotiations in the DDA round, including U.S. objectives in the negotiations. The report 
concludes with a status report on the negotiations and an examination of potential results. 
                                                             
1
 Information was obtained in a meeting with John Goyer, Vice-President for International Trade Negotiations and 
Investment, U.S. Coalition of Services Industries. 
2
 Title XXI (Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002), Trade Act of 2002. (P.L. 107-210). 
T 
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The Significance of Services 
“Services” encompass an ever-widening range of economic activities. According to one 
definition, services are 
a diverse group of economic activities not directly associated with the manufacture of goods, 
mining or agriculture. They typically involve the provision of human value-added in the 
form of labor, advice, managerial skill, entertainment, training, intermediation, and the like.3 
Services differ from manufactured goods in that they are intangible, cannot be stored and must be 
consumed at the point of production (trips to the doctor, enjoying a meal at the restaurant). 
However, rapid changes in technology are reducing even these restrictions on services (computer 
software that can be stored online, on disks, tape, etc.; accounting services that are provided via 
the internet).4 Illustrative examples of services include wholesale and retail trade; transportation 
and warehousing; information; banking and insurance; professional, scientific, and technical 
services; education; arts and entertainment; health care and social assistance; food and 
accommodation services; construction; communication; and public administration.5 
Services are an increasingly significant sector of the U.S. economy.  In 2010, the service sector 
accounted for 83% of U.S. nonagricultural payroll jobs, for 65% of U.S. GDP (up from 55% in 
1976).6 Many services have not only intrinsic value but are also critical to running other parts of 
large economies. For example, financial services (banking, investment, insurance) are the means 
by which capital flows throughout an economy from those who have it (savers, investors) to those 
who need it (borrowers). Financial services are often called the lifeblood of an economy. Delivery 
services are critical to ensuring that intermediate production goods and final end-user goods are 
available when needed. Distribution services (retail and wholesale services) provide the means by 
which goods are made available to consumers. Inefficiencies in any of these industries could have 
adverse consequences for the whole economy. 
U.S. trade in services, as customarily measured, plays an important role in overall U.S. trade, 
albeit, a much smaller role than trade in goods. In 2010 services accounted for 30% of total U.S. 
exports of goods and services and 17% of total U.S. imports of goods and services.7 
Because most services require direct contact between supplier and consumer, many service 
providers prefer to establish or must establish a presence in the country of the consumer. For 
example, hotel and restaurant services require a presence in the country of the consumer. 
Providers of legal, accounting, and construction services prefer a direct presence because they 
need access to expert knowledge of the laws and regulations of the country in which they are 
doing business and they require proximity to clients. Thus, cross-border services trade data do not 
capture all of the trade in services. 
                                                             
3
 OECD. Science Technology Industry Business and Industry Policy Forum Series. The Service Economy. 2000. Paris. 
p. 7 
4
 Ibid. 
5
 Ibid. OECD, p. 39. 
6
 White House. Council of Economic Advisers. Economic Report of the President. January 2009. p. 294, p. 338.  
7
 CRS calculations based data from U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. U.S. International Trade in 
Goods and Services FT-900. p. 1. 
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Data on sales of services by foreign affiliates of U.S.-owned companies and by U.S. affiliates of 
foreign-owned firms help to provide a more accurate, albeit still incomplete, measurement of 
trade in services. In 2008 (the latest year for which published data are available), U.S. firms sold 
$1,137 billion in services to foreigners through their majority-owned foreign affiliates (compared 
to $518 billion in U.S. cross-border exports). Foreign firms sold U.S. residents $727 billion in 
services through their majority-owned foreign affiliates located in the United States (compared to 
$366 billion in cross-border imports).8 Even these two sets of figures do not capture the total 
value of trade in services. Two other modes of services delivery are through the temporary 
movement of consumers to the location of the provider and the temporary movement of the 
provider to the location of the consumer. U.S. data on the sales of services via these two modes of 
delivery are not readily available. 
The GATS: The International Rules of Trade 
The seeds for multilateral negotiations in services trade were planted more than a quarter century 
ago. In the Trade Act of 1974, the Congress instructed the Administration to promote an 
agreement on trade in services under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) during 
the Tokyo Round negotiations. The Tokyo Round concluded in 1979 without a services 
agreement, but the industrialized countries, led by the United States, continued to press for its 
inclusion in later negotiations. By contrast, developing countries, whose service sectors are less 
advanced than those of the industrialized countries, were reluctant to have services covered by 
international trade rules. Eventually services were included as part of the Uruguay Round 
negotiations launched in 1986.9 During the Uruguay Round, GATT members agreed to a new set 
of rules for services, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), and a new agency, the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), to administer the GATS, the GATT, and the other Uruguay 
Round Agreements, known as the Marrakesh Agreement.10 
Trade scholar Geza Feketekuty identifies three main challenges to constructing rules for 
international trade in services: (1) to target the rules at domestic regulations that are the primary 
sources of barriers to trade in services; (2) to distinguish the legitimate use of regulations to 
protect the health and safety of residents from the use of regulations to protect domestic service 
providers from competition; and (3) to take into account that most services transactions take place 
behind customs borders rather than at customs border (as in the case of like goods trade).11 In 
addition to these, one might identify a fourth challenge: technology advances, such as the 
introduction of the internet, make once non-tradable services, for example consulting, tradable 
and also have led to the rapid introduction of services products that can be “outsourced” across 
                                                             
8
 Bureau of Economic Analysis. U.S. Department of Commerce. Sales of Services to Foreign and U.S. Markets 
Through Cross-Border Trade and Through Affiliates. http://www.bea.gov. 
9
 Feketekuty, Geza. International Trade in Services: An Overview and Blueprint for Negotiations. American Enterprise 
Institute. Ballinger Publishers. 1988. p. 194. 
10
 The Marrakesh Agreement includes GATT (1994) and other agreements that govern trade in goods; the agreement 
on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS); the GATS; Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) and the 
so-called plurilateral agreements (agreements that WTO members are not obligated to sign)—the Government 
Procurement Agreement, Agreement on Trade Civil Aircraft, International Dairy Agreement, and the International 
Bovine Meat Agreement. 
11
 Feketekuty, Geza. Assessing the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services and Improving the GATS 
Architecture. A Brookings Paper. http://www.commercialdiplomacy.org/articles_news/brookings.htm. 1999. 
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borders. All of these challenges suggest a set of rules sufficiently flexible to meet them yet 
sufficiently rigid to provide meaningful discipline to WTO members’ activities. 
The Four Modes of Delivery 
An important element to the structure of the GATS and the negotiations to expand the coverage of 
the GATS has been the recognition that most services transactions are conducted inside borders 
and that barriers to trade in services occur inside customs barriers. Effective trade rules would 
have to take into account the various modes of delivery in order to discern the barriers that 
foreign providers of services encounter when trying to sell in a trade-partner’s market. The GATS 
divides the modes of delivery of services into four categories. As will be discussed later, the 
concessions that a member country makes in opening up its services market are largely mode-
dependent. The four modes of delivery are:\ 
• Cross-border supply (mode 1)—the service is supplied from one country to 
another. The supplier and consumer remain in their respective countries, while 
the service crosses the border. For example, a U.S. architectural firm based in 
Chicago is hired by a client in Mexico to design a building. The U.S. firm does 
the design in Chicago and sends the blueprints to its client in Mexico. 
• Consumption abroad (mode 2)—The consumer physically travels to another 
country to obtain the service. A Mexican client travels to the United States to 
obtain the services of a U.S. architectural firm. 
• Commercial presence (mode 3)—The supplier of a service establishes a branch, 
agency, or wholly owned subsidiary in another country and supplies services to 
the local market. A U.S. architectural firm establishes a subsidiary in Mexico to 
sell services to local clients. 
• Presence of natural persons (mode 4)—Individual supplier travels temporarily 
to the country of the consumer. A U.S. architect travels to Mexico to provide 
design services to her Mexican client. 
The Structure of the GATS 
The GATS is an agreement among the 153 WTO members representing many levels of economic 
development. It provides the only multilateral framework of principles and rules for government 
policies and regulations affecting trade in services. The GATS remains a work in progress. 
The preamble to the GATS sets out its overall purposes and principles: 
• trade expansion to promote economic development; 
• progressive trade liberalization; 
• preservation of member governments’ right to regulate services sectors to meet 
national policy objectives; and 
• facilitation of participation of developing countries and recognition of special 
circumstances of least developed countries (LDCs). 
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The GATS is divided into six parts.12 Part I (Article I ) defines the scope of the GATS and 
provides that its provisions apply 
• to all services, except those supplied in the routine exercise of government 
authority; 
• to all government barriers to trade in services at all levels of government—
national, regional, and local; and 
• to all four modes of delivery of services. 
Part II (Articles II-XV) presents the “principles and obligations.” These principles and 
obligations apply to all services sectors whether or not the sectors are specifically listed in a 
member’s schedule of commitments—the list of service sectors that are to be covered by the 
GATS. They include 
• unconditional most-favored-nation (MFN) non-discriminatory treatment—
services imported from one member country cannot be treated any less favorably 
than the services imported from another member country; 13 
• transparency—governments must publish rules and regulations to ensure that 
foreign providers have access to those rules and regulations; 
• reasonable, impartial and objective administration of government rules and 
regulations that apply to services; and 
• monopoly suppliers must act consistently with obligations under the GATS. 
Part II also lays out some exceptions: 
• a member incurring balance of payments difficulties may temporarily restrict 
trade in services covered by the agreement; and 
• a member may circumvent GATS obligations for national security purposes. 
Part III (Articles XVI-XVIII) of the GATS establishes market access and national treatment 
obligations for members. The GATS 
• binds each member to its commitments once it has made them—a member may 
not impose less favorable treatment than what it has committed to; 
• prohibits member-country governments from placing limits on suppliers of 
services from other member countries regarding—the number of foreign service 
suppliers, the total value of service transactions or assets, the number of 
transactions or value of output, the type of legal entity or joint venture through 
                                                             
12
 This description of the GATS is based on WTO Secretariat—Trade in Services Division. An Introduction to the 
GATS. October 1999. http://www.wto.org. Not all services issues were resolved when the Uruguay Round was 
completed in 1993. Negotiations on financial services and telecommunications services continued until agreements 
were reached in 1997. 
13
 The GATS differs from the GATT in that it has allowed members to take temporary (to expire three years after 
GATS enactment for original members or three years after a new member’s accession) exemptions to MFN treatment. 
The exemptions are listed in a special annex to the GATS. The GATS allows only these one-time exemptions. The 
GATS (as is the case of the GATT) also allows MFN exemptions in the cases of regional agreements. (Article V). 
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which services may be supplied, and the share of foreign capital or total value of 
foreign direct investment; 
• requires that member governments accord service suppliers from other member 
countries national treatment—a WTO member service provider may not be 
treated any less favorably than a domestic provider of a like service; and 
• allows members to negotiate further reductions in barriers to trade in services. 
Importantly, unlike MFN treatment and the other principles listed in Part II, which apply to all 
service providers more or less unconditionally, the national treatment and market access 
obligations under Part III are restricted. They apply only to those services and the four modes of 
delivery listed in each member’s schedule of commitments. National treatment and market access 
obligations do not apply to services sectors outside the schedule of commitments. (The “Schedule 
of Commitments” is described in detail below.) This is often referred to as the positive list 
approach to trade commitments. (The negative list would include all services sectors unless 
specifically excluded.) Each member country’s schedule of commitments is contained in an annex 
to the GATS. 
Parts IV-VI (Articles XIX-XXIX) are technical but important elements of the agreement. 
Among other things, they require that, no later than five years after the GATS went into force, 
WTO members start new negotiations (which they have done) to expand coverage of the 
agreement, and they require that conflicts between members involving implementation of the 
GATS be handled in the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism. 
The GATS also has annexes. They include annexes on MFN exemptions; financial services that 
allows governments to take “prudent” actions to protect investors or otherwise maintain the 
integrity of the national financial system; transportation services; telecommunication services; 
maritime services; and mode-4 delivery. The schedule of commitments from each WTO member 
are also included as an annex. 
Post-Uruguay Round Negotiations and Agreements 
Signatories to the GATS determined negotiations had not been completed, but they did not want 
to delay the completion of the rest of the Uruguay Round agreements. The GATS stipulated that 
negotiations were to continue on financial services, telecommunication services, maritime 
services, and mode-4 delivery. The agreements reached would be included as part of the GATS 
when they entered into force. Agreements were concluded on basic telecommunications in 
February 1997 and financial services on December 1997. Negotiations on mode-4 (movement of 
natural persons) ended on July 28, 1995, with few results, and negotiations on maritime services 
ended in June 1996 without conclusion and were to resume in the current round. 
Schedule of Commitments 
The commitments that WTO members make regarding national treatment and market access in 
specific service sectors or subsectors constitute a major portion of a member’s obligations under 
the GATS and a significant element of the negotiations during the Doha Development Agenda 
round. Therefore, a general explanation of what comprises a member’s schedule of commitments 
(SC) is in order. 
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Each WTO member was required to submit a SC during the negotiations of the GATS. Each new 
member is required to submit a schedule of commitments when it accedes to the WTO. Each of 
the national schedules is a part of the GATS. The SC has been compared to the tariff schedules of 
each WTO member; however, the schedules of commitments on services are more complex than 
the tariff schedules. 
The schedule is divided into four columns. The first column lists the sector or subsector for which 
commitments are made. The second column lists for that sector or subsector the restrictions on 
market access that are to be applied for each of the four modes of delivery. The third column lists 
the restrictions on national treatment that are to be applied for each of the four modes of delivery. 
The fourth column lists any additional commitments the member has made for the sector or 
subsector. The schedule is also divided into two parts. In the first part, the member country 
identifies its horizontal commitments, that is, commitments on trade liberalization that apply to all 
services sectors and subsectors listed in the schedule. The second part lists the sector-specific 
commitments. The SCs tend to be long documents because the WTO member must identify each 
service sector and subsector for which it is making a trade liberalization commitment, and the 
member must identify the exceptions on market access and national treatment for each of the four 
modes of delivery for each sector and subsector. 
The Negotiations 
The negotiations on services in the DDA have two fundamental objectives. One objective is to 
reform the current GATS rules and principles. The second objective is for each member country 
to refine and expand its schedule of commitments to increase the number of service sectors to be 
covered and to reduce the limitations on national treatment and market access. 
This section examines the evolution of the current negotiations, their structure, and their status. It 
also discusses U.S. goals and those of other major trading partners and groups of members. 
The Evolution of the Negotiations 
At the end of the Uruguay Round, the negotiators acknowledged that they needed to maintain the 
momentum of the service negotiations even if a comprehensive new round of negotiations was 
not to be launched. Thus, Article XIX of the GATS required WTO members to begin a new set of 
negotiations on services no later than five years after the GATS entered into force (that is, 2000) 
as part of the so-called WTO “built-in agenda.” Article XIX stipulates that participants work to 
resolve some conceptual and procedural issues, for example, how to provide special treatment to 
least developed countries. 
The GATS also mandates that the negotiations address the issue of government subsidies in trade 
in services and possible countervailing actions (Article XV), emergency safeguard measures, that 
is, measures to counter surges in imports that cause or threaten to cause injury to a domestic 
industry (Article X), and government procurement in services trade (Article XIII). 
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The new services negotiations began in 2000 but progressed slowly in part because of the adverse 
political climate caused by the failure of the 1999 WTO Ministerial in Seattle.14 In March 2001, 
the WTO’s Council for Trade in Services, the body that administers the GATS and oversees 
negotiations on services, approved the guidelines that shape the current set of negotiations. The 
guidelines incorporate the mandates and procedures rooted in the GATS. The guidelines stipulate: 
• Objectives and Principles: The main objective is progressive liberalization of 
trade in services as a means to promote economic growth and development while 
recognizing the sovereign right of members to regulate services sector and 
introduce new regulations. 
• Scope: All service sectors and subsectors and all modes of delivery are subject to 
negotiations. Negotiations on safeguards measures, were to be completed by 
March 2002. (That deadline was extended eventually to the end of the DDA.) 
• Modalities and Procedures: The negotiations are to be conducted in special 
sessions of the Council for Trade in Services and open to all WTO members and 
acceding countries. The starting point of the negotiations would be the scheduled 
commitments at the time. The “request-offer” format (discussed below) is to be 
used for negotiating new commitments. In addition, special attention is to be 
given to the special needs of developing countries in requesting commitments 
from them and making commitments to them. (Modalities were adopted on 
September 3, 2003.) Furthermore, the members are to negotiate modalities on 
how to give negotiating credit for autonomous liberalization—reduction in trade 
barriers on services undertaken outside of negotiations. (On March 6, 2003, 
members agreed to a modality on the treatment of autonomous liberalizations.)15 
Modalities are methods or measures, such as formulas, to negotiate trade 
liberalization. 
After the false start in Seattle, the WTO members successfully launched DDA in November 2001. 
The Ministerial Declaration that announced the mandates for the round folded the services 
negotiation into the agenda of the DDA round. The Declaration reaffirms the March 2001 
guidelines but included deadlines to spur the negotiators: participants were to submit their initial 
requests for market access and national treatment commitments from each member by June 30, 
2002, and their initial offers of commitments they would be willing to make by March 31, 2003. 
The services negotiations floundered as deadlines passed. The rest of the DDA negotiations were 
on the verge of collapse after the member countries could not agree at the September 2003 
Ministerial in Cancun on modalities for the agriculture negotiations and non-agricultural market 
access. After much consternation and discussion, WTO members forged a negotiating framework 
or “package” of objectives to put the round back on track in July 2004. 
The framework reaffirms the mandates contained in the Doha Ministerial Declaration. The July 
2004 framework specifically charged the negotiators to complete and submit their initial offers as 
soon as possible, to submit revised offers by May 2005 and to ensure that the offers are of “high 
quality.” These pronouncements were in response to complaints from WTO officials that only a 
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few of the participants had met the deadlines for initial offers and the quality of those offers left 
much to be desired. 
Although the July framework mentioned services only briefly, the fact that it was mentioned at all 
is considered important to the U.S. business community. In so doing, the DDA negotiators placed 
services on par with the negotiations on agriculture and on market access for non-agricultural 
goods.16 
The Structure of the Negotiations 
The negotiations on rules are conducted by working groups of representatives of interested 
members. The negotiations on national treatment and market access commitments are addressed 
by all members using the request-offer format. 
In the initial phase of the negotiations, each WTO member submits its “wish-list” or “request” of 
what commitments it would like other members to “offer” to make. The negotiations then 
continue with each member responding to the requests with its initial “offer” of the commitments 
it would be willing to make. The process continues with more negotiations and revised offers 
until the parties have reached a consensus that the commitment offers of each member are 
acceptable. Unlike the negotiations on goods in the WTO that are conducted multilaterally among 
all members at the same time, the services “request-offer” negotiations consist of many series of 
simultaneous bilateral, plurilateral (many participants), and multilateral (WTO-wide) negotiations 
among WTO members. The final set of commitment offers or agreements must be accepted by all 
members to become part of the GATS. 
The Status of the DDA Negotiations and Major 
Issues 
The WTO services negotiations have been going on for more than five years. However, as with 
the negotiations in agriculture and non-agriculture market access that have proceeded slowly with 
missed deadlines and disappointing results. In July 2006, WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy 
suspended the entire DDA negotiations, including the services negotiations, because member 
countries could not agree on fundamental modalities for the negotiations in agriculture trade. He 
resumed the negotiations in 2007, continuing to the present. Negotiators from major groups of 
developed and developing countries worked to nail down the basic elements of a draft text; 
however, they failed so far to reach a consensus on the basic negotiating objectives. 
This section reviews the main objectives of the United States and of chief trading partners and 
examines some of the critical issues that have emerged during the negotiations. 
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U.S. Goals17 
The United States presented its major goals for the negotiations in the Doha Development Agenda 
(DDA) Round in July 2002 in its initial set of requests, although it had stated many of the goals in 
earlier negotiating sessions prior to the launch of the DDA. U.S. negotiators derived these 
objectives during consultations with U.S. service industry representatives. The main U.S. goal is 
to secure as many market access commitments from as many trading partners as possible. U.S. 
policymakers have targeted several other goals for the services negotiations. 
Quality of Commitments 
A long-standing U.S. complaint has been that the market access and national treatment 
commitments that were made during the Uruguay Round were not as liberal as the then-existing 
market environment. That is, WTO members were reluctant to commit to maintaining (or 
“binding” in WTO parlance) the market openness at the levels that were actually in place. The 
United States has called on countries to raise the level of bindings to actual levels to prevent 
slippage. 
Regulatory Transparency 
Government regulation is a pervasive aspect of services trade, even more so than in manufactured 
goods trade, in virtually all developed and developing economies. GATS rules recognize 
legitimate needs for governments to regulate services to ensure the health and safety of 
consumers, for example, by making sure that lawyers and doctors are qualified to practice their 
professions. However, in most governments, services sectors are regulated by different agencies 
depending on the service, and one service sector may be regulated by more than one government 
agency. Some sectors may be regulated by central or federal agencies, while others are regulated 
by regional or local agencies or perhaps by agencies at various administrative levels. Service 
providers whether domestic or foreign must be aware of regulations and regulatory procedures in 
order to conduct business. 
U.S. service providers have cited the lack of transparency in the development and implementation 
of regulations as a primary obstacle to increasing foreign trade in services in many markets, 
particularly in developing countries. The United States wants WTO member countries to make 
commitments 
• to establish clear, publicly available domestic procedures for application for 
licenses or authorizations and their renewal or extension; 
• to establish domestic procedures that provide for a standard formal process for 
informing the public of regulations or changes to existing regulations, prior to 
their final consideration by the relevant authority and entry into effect; and 
• to provide opportunities for interested parties to comment and ask questions as 
regulations are developed, changed, and implemented. 
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Commercial Presence (Mode-3) 
U.S. service providers across a number of sectors point to the importance of establishing a 
commercial presence in a local market in order to conduct business. U.S. negotiators have 
requested from WTO members that they commit horizontally (across all sectors) to eliminate 
unnecessary restrictions on foreign direct investment, such as limits on the forms in which a 
foreign direct investment can take (partnership, branch, minority ownership, etc.). 
Financial Services 
Financial services include insurance, banking, securities, asset management, pension funds, 
financial information and advisory services. The United States has requested that trading partners 
make commitments to improve market access in financial services, on transparency in financial 
services regulations, and fairness in applying financial services regulations. Regarding insurance 
in particular, the United States proposed commitments to expedite new-to-market initiatives. 
Telecommunications Services 
The United States requested that WTO partners increase market access in telecommunications 
services, including value-added services, adopt commitments made in the 1998 
Telecommunications Agreement, and privatize telecommunications carriers. In addition, the 
United States has requested market access commitments regarding owning and leasing cable 
facilities. 
Express Delivery Services 
The United States has requested increased access for road freight transport, order processing 
services, inventory management services, among other express delivery services. In addition, the 
United States asked WTO members to address the issue of cross-subsidization of express delivery 
services, where government authorized monopolies (such as first class postal services) share 
revenues with express delivery carriers. 
Energy Services 
This category includes energy exploration services, energy transmission and distribution, energy 
marketing and trading, and energy conservation and anti-pollution services. The United States has 
requested increased market access to all of these services markets. In addition, the United States 
has requested that trading partners make commitments regarding third-party access to and use of 
energy transportation facilities, such as interconnection with energy networks and grids. Energy 
services do not include energy generation or ownership. 
Environmental Services 
Services that protect the environment from degradation have been another priority for the United 
States in the services negotiations. The United States has requested trading partners to provide 
increased access to markets for services related to wastewater treatment services, solid/hazardous 
waste management, soil and water cleanup, noise and vibration abatement, protection of 
biodiversity and landscape, among other environment-related areas. 
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Distribution Services 
The United States has requested trading partners to provide full market access to retail, wholesale, 
and franchising services. This access would include both services direct delivery to the customer 
or remotely through catalogue, video, or electronic sales. 
Education and Training Services (ETS) 
In the context of U.S. requests, ETS includes higher education, training services, and testing 
services provided in universities and schools, as well as in work places. Training services include 
job-related courses. ETS do not include primary or secondary education, and U.S. requests for 
commitments to increased market access do not aim to replace public education. 
Professional Services 
The United States has asked that trading partners increase market access for foreign lawyers, 
accounts, and other providers of professional services. To do so, they should remove citizenship 
requirements for licensing, remove restrictions on foreign ownership, lift restrictions on form of 
organization (subsidiary versus branch or partnership), and remove restrictions on associations 
with local professionals. 
Other services 
The United States has requested increased market access for computer and related services 
including computer consulting, software development, data processing, and systems integration 
and maintenance services. It has also requested improved market access commitments for 
audiovisual and advertising services. 
U.S. Offers 
The United States presented its initial offer of proposed commitments on March 31, 2003, at the 
deadline set in the Doha Ministerial Declaration. It submitted a revised offer on May 31, 2005, 
meeting the deadline set in the July 2004 Framework. 
The U.S. initial and revised offers would “bind” or commit the United States to maintain national 
treatment and market access to foreign service providers that are already in place, including 
improvements that have been made since the Uruguay Round agreements were enacted. In other 
words, the United States would commit to refrain from reducing its current level of trade 
liberalization.18 
The United States defends its offers arguing that its services markets are already quite open, and 
that it looks for WTO members to meet U.S. standards. To a large degree this is an accurate 
statement. Many U.S. services industries are very competitive and, therefore, can withstand 
foreign competition. Nations logically open their markets in the areas in which they are 
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competitive while protecting sectors that are not competitive. Nevertheless, as will be noted later, 
not all U.S. WTO-trading partners have been so sanguine about the U.S. offers. 
The U.S. offers include horizontal commitments, that is commitments that apply to all sectors and 
subsectors that are listed in the U.S. schedule of commitments. The horizontal commitments 
include the following areas: 
• Temporary entry of personnel (Mode-4): The United States categorically 
makes no commitments regarding the temporary entry of personnel other than for 
specific groups of personnel most of whom would be working for foreign firms 
with affiliates in the United States. These include services sales persons, who sell 
within the company but not to the U.S. public and who are in the United States 
no longer than 90 days; inter-corporate transferees (managers, executives, and 
specialists) for up to three years with the possibility for extension for up to an 
additional two years; and personnel engaged in the establishment of a business 
entity in the United States. The United States also allows temporary entry for 
fashion models and service providers in other specialty occupations. 
• Acquisition of land: The United States permits the temporary entry of personnel 
engaged in the acquisition of land in the scheduled services sectors and 
subsectors. The U.S. proposal notes, however, that the initial acquisition of 
federally owned land is restricted to U.S. citizens. 
• Taxation measures: Foreigners engaged in providing scheduled services are 
taxed the same as U.S. residents with a few exceptions. 
Besides the horizontal commitments, the United States has offered scheduled commitments in a 
number of sectors and subsectors: business services, including professional services, accounting 
and bookkeeping, taxation services, and architectural and engineering services. The format for 
scheduling commitments requires WTO members to identify any national treatment and market 
access exceptions for each of the four delivery modes for each of the scheduled sectors and 
subsectors. In the case of the business services most of the exceptions relate to state restrictions or 
requirements on foreign service providers. 
In addition to business services, the United States has offered to make commitments in services 
related to market research and public opinion polling; management consulting; computer and 
related services; real estate services (that is, services provided to the ownership or leasing of 
property); services incidental to agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing; express delivery and 
other delivery services; telecommunication services (with the national treatment exception that 
foreigners cannot own common carrier or radio licenses); wholesale and retail trade services and 
franchising; higher education; environmental services; financial services; health related and social 
services; travel and tourism; recreational, cultural and specialty services; transportation services 
(except maritime services); energy services; and construction and related services. 
Developing countries have criticized the United States for not offering broader commitments, 
arguing that the sectors in which the United States has offered commitments, such as express 
delivery and energy services, are not ones that would be useful to them.19 The European Union 
has criticized the United States for not offering to open maritime services and postal services to 
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foreign competition.20 Developing countries and some developed countries have focused most of 
their criticism on U.S. commitments and offers under the mode-4 category of delivery, for 
example, that U.S. offers are restricted to business executives and other personnel and with close 
ties to foreign companies having a commercial presence in the United States. India argues that it 
would need access for software specialists, computer experts, and information technology 
engineers who would not be directly affiliated to an Indian-owned firm in the United States.21 
(Mode-4 has proved to be one of the most contentious issues in the DDA and is discussed in more 
detail later.) 
Major Issues in the Negotiations 
The original goal of completing the negotiations by January 1, 2005, has long passed, and 
deadlines accomplishing procedural steps, such as initial and revised offers, have had to be 
rescheduled. The complexity of the negotiations may go a long way in explaining the retarded 
pace, but reports by trade negotiators and discussions with experts suggest several underlying 
challenges. 
Negotiating Format 
Some negotiators and other observers have suggested that the “request-offer” negotiating format 
might be stalling the process. The United States and the EU separately proposed that negotiators 
establish “benchmarks” of certain targeted sectors on which WTO members would agree to make 
commitments. U.S. officials argued for commitments in six core sectors—financial services, 
telecommunications, energy, express delivery, computer and other information-related services, 
and audio-visual services. The EU argued for a smaller list and would allow members to choose 
to make commitments from a certain percentage of the core sectors for all four delivery modes.  
The “benchmark” proposals met with strong opposition from many developing countries who 
asserted that it was too late in the negotiation to use a different negotiating format and that the 
established mandate for the DDA negotiations specifically requires the “request-offer” format to 
be used. (Proponents of “benchmarks” responded that they would be used as a supplement to the 
“request-offer” approach and not as a substitute.) Some developing countries also argued that 
benchmarks would probably focus on those sectors that the developed countries favored since 
they wield the most influence.22 The U.S. services business community voiced concern that 
focusing on benchmarks might divert the attention of negotiators and cause additional delays in 
the process.23 
Canada proposed, supported by the United States and other developed countries, changes in the 
negotiating process in order to provide a jolt to the negotiations on services. For example, the 
United States has pressed to have countries identify more clearly concessions that they would we 
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willing to put on the table before issues in the agriculture and non-agricultural negotiations are 
completed. The proposal was intended to address a frustration on the part of those countries that 
the current “sequencing” of negotiations—services to follow agriculture and non-agriculture—
has frustrated the services negotiations. Developing countries have rejected the proposal and 
insist on maintaining the current sequencing.24  
The positive list approach (whereby members list only the sectors and subsectors that are to be 
covered) to market access commitments has also been criticized. The primary criticism has been 
that it could be a disincentive to market access liberalization: the default in the negotiations is that 
sectors and subsectors are not covered by WTO rules unless specifically identified and the 
schedules of commitments would not cover new sectors and subsectors that emerge in between 
rounds of negotiations. 
On the other hand, this approach is also viewed as a more conducive way to get reluctant 
members, particularly developing countries, to participate in the negotiations. The United States 
prefers the “negative list” approach and has used it in free trade agreements. 
Mode-4 
Mode-4 delivery, temporary entry of supply personnel, has become one of the most controversial 
issues at this stage of the negotiations in services. It has divided many developed countries and 
developing countries, although differing positions have emerged among members of each 
category. Much of developing country criticism of the United States has been regarding mode-4. 
It has also created some tension between the U.S. business community and the U.S. government. 
All of this criticism is despite the fact that mode-4 accounts for less that 1% of world trade in 
services.25 
The controversy arises in part because the issue of mode-4 delivery is closely related to 
immigration policy in the United States and some other countries, and comes at a time when the 
United States has tightened restrictions in response to the attacks of September 11, 2001. 
Article I-1(d) defines mode-4 as pertaining to the supply of a service, “by a service supplier of 
one [WTO] Member, through presence of natural persons of a Member in the territory of any 
other Member.” An annex to the GATS on mode-4 further states that the GATS, “shall not apply 
to measures affecting natural persons seeking access to the employment market of a Member, nor 
shall it apply to measures regarding citizenship, residence or employment on a permanent basis.” 
Several developing countries have criticized the United States for not offering more on mode-4 
commitments. India has criticized the visa restrictions placed on temporary workers entering the 
United States, particularly workers not directly affiliated with companies located in the United 
States and has also called for greater transparency of U.S. immigration regulations pertaining to 
the temporary entry of personnel.26 
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The mode-4 issue has also manifested itself as an issue of congressional authority. In July 2003, 
during congressional consideration of the implementing bills for the U.S.-Chile and U.S.-
Singapore free trade agreements, members of the Senate Judiciary Committee and the House 
Judiciary Committee objected to the inclusion of changes in U.S. visa policies to allow increases 
in the quotas of workers entering the United States. They argued that changes in visa rules must 
be separate from trade legislation that is considered by Congress under expedited (fast-track) 
procedures. Compromises were reached to allow the two bills to be voted on, but not without 
bipartisan warnings from both committees that changes in visa policy should no longer be part of 
bilateral or multilateral trade agreements.27 
The U.S. business community has maintained that the United States needs to be more flexible in 
its mode-4 offers, arguing that failure to do so stalls the negotiations and prevents United States 
from obtaining useful commitments from developing countries. Business groups have proposed 
alternative mode-4 options to move the negotiations forward.28 
Negotiations on Rules 
Not much has been accomplished regarding establishing rules on subsidies and emergency 
safeguard measures for services. Developing countries, especially East Asian developing 
countries, consider these issues a high priority. However, the negotiators have not been able to 
resolve basic questions, such as, what would constitute a countervailable subsidy, how would it 
be measured and how to measure import surges to which a WTO member could apply safeguards 
measures. Negotiations on government procurement have also proceeded slowly.29 
Status and Prospects 
There is a general consensus that after more than 10 years the services negotiations have not 
progressed very far. One assessment for World Bank concluded the offers that many WTO 
members, especially the developing countries, have changed little from the commitments that 
they made under the Uruguay Round and do not reflect the actual levels of openness of their 
services market. The study indicates that the best offers made to date are, on average, 1.9 times 
more restrictive than the actual policies.30 In other words, WTO members have refused to even 
lock in (bind) the trade in services they have in place but instead want to have the option of 
applying more restrictions on trade in services without violating WTO commitments.  
 
                                                             
27
 For more information on immigration issues and trade agreements, see CRS Report RL32982, Immigration Issues in 
Trade Agreements, by Ruth Ellen Wasem. 
28
 U.S. Industry Sees Progress in Mode 4 as Key to Success in Overall WTO Talks. International Trade Reporter. 
February 10, 2005. p. 212. See also, National Foreign Trade Council. The Doha Development Agenda and GATS 
Mode-4: Recommendations for Improved Rules on Temporary Global Mobility. March 2005. 
29
 World Trade Organization. Council for Trade in Services. Report by the Chairman to the Trade Negotiations 
Committee. 11 July 2005. TN/S/20 available at http://www.wto.org. Also information was obtained in a meeting with 
John Goyer, Vice-President for International Trade Negotiations and Investment, U.S. Coalition of Services Industries. 
30
 The World Bank. Conclude Doha: IT Matters! Policy Research Working Paper. November 2009. p. 9. 
Trade in Services: The Doha Development Agenda Negotiations and U.S. Goals 
 
Congressional Research Service 17 
The prospects of the negotiations were set back when WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy 
suspended the DDA, including the services negotiations, indefinitely on July 24, 2006, after a 
meeting of the G-6 WTO members, consisting of the United States, the European Union, Japan, 
Australia, Brazil, and India, failed to agree on the basic conditions or modalities, for conducting 
the agriculture and NAMA negotiations. Although the negotiations resumed in 2007, progress on 
the services negotiations remains sluggish at best. Even before the suspension, the services 
negotiations had not been going well.  
Several possible reasons can be cited for the lack of progress. One is the division between 
developed countries that have advanced services sectors employing highly skilled labor and the 
developing countries with less-developed services industries. The former group seeks market 
opportunities for its services providers and is more willing to open its markets to competition. 
The latter group is more protective of its domestic services providers. 
The halting progress in the agriculture and NAMA negotiations in the DDA has been a major 
impediment to the services negotiations. Some developing countries have asserted that they will 
not improve their offers until the United States and the European Union commit to reduce their 
agriculture subsidies. The developed countries want commitments from developing countries to 
reduce the “water” in their commitments, that is, the difference between the liberalization they 
have agreed to (bound) and their actual level of market liberalization. 
A third reason could be the complexity of the agenda of the services negotiations and the number 
of players involved. “Services” includes a broad range of economic activities many with few 
characteristics in common except that they are not goods. The trade barriers exporters face differ 
across services sectors making the formulation of trade rules a significant challenge. Furthermore, 
services negotiations include many participants. In addition to trade ministers, they include 
representatives of regulatory agencies many of whom do not consider trade liberalization a 
primary part of their mission. 
The prospects for the negotiations are difficult to evaluate at this point. It is not unusual for 
negotiations to lag as participants wait to place their best negotiating positions on the table until 
just before crucial deadlines are reached. 
Several factors will determine if and when the services negotiations will be completed. One factor 
is the political will the WTO members can muster to overcome the obstacles that plague the 
negotiations. Another factor is the extent the various participants are willing to compromise on 
goals in order to reach agreements. And a third factor is how quickly the issues in agriculture and 
non-agriculture market access are resolved; the sooner they are resolved the sooner negotiators 
can devote their full attention to the services negotiations. 
From December 13-18, 2005, WTO trade ministers held the sixth WTO Ministerial in Hong 
Kong. The trade ministers were expected to emerge from meeting with modalities that would 
accelerate the DDA negotiations to their conclusion by the end of 2006. In the Hong Kong 
Ministerial Declaration, WTO members reaffirmed their commitment to complete the services 
negotiations with special consideration given to the needs of developing and the least developed 
countries. Annex C to the Declaration provides modalities and parameters for completing the 
negotiations. 
In September 2007, the chairman of the trade in services negotiations began a process to develop 
a draft text of an agreement and called on member-country negotiators to submit contributions. 
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However, by the end of 2007, it was clear that the countries were still sharply divided on basic 
objectives. Developed countries, including the United States, have argued for member-countries 
at a minimum to commit to binding their current practices on trade in services. Developing 
countries, including Argentina, argued against such benchmarks and resisted making additional 
commitments until developed countries commit to greater reductions of subsidies for 
agriculture.31 In July 2008, WTO General Director Lamy called a ministerial meeting in Geneva 
to again try to hammer out the modalities for the agriculture and NAMA negotiations. On July 26, 
2008, a “signaling” conference was held with 32 representatives, including the United States and 
two representing the EU. The conference was designed to ascertain where participants stood in 
terms of the offers they were willing to make and the expectation they have of their trading 
partners.32 While the conference did bring to light some areas of possible commitment, it did little 
to move the negotiations ahead. In 2009, the WTO members held “cluster” meetings to try to 
provide some momentum with limited results. There was little accomplished in the services 
negotiations in 2010, in part because they remained hostage to the agriculture and NAMA and 
negotiations, but also because many of the participants were reluctant to go beyond current levels 
of liberalization.33 
In a written question submitted to Michael Punke as part of his confirmation hearing to become 
deputy USTR, ranking member of Senate Finance Committee Senator Charles Grassley said, “the 
Doha services negotiations are bogged down. You’ll need a strong services package if you want 
my support for an agreement.” 34 
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